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At an IAS Tenn, Pait 13 of the Supreme Court of 
the State of New York, held in and for the 
County of Kings, at the Courthouse, at Civic 
Center, Brooklyn, New York, on the 12111 day of 
March, 2007. 
P RE S EN T: 
HON. MARK I. PARTNOW, 
Justice. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 
lN THE MA TIER OF THE APPl,:ICATION OF 
IVAN Rios, 
Petitioner, 
For a Judgment Pursuant to Aiticle 78 
of the Civil Procedure Law and Rules 
- agamst - Index No. 31731106 
NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE, 
Respondent. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 
The fol lowing ptipers numbered I to 3 read on this motion: 
Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause/ 
Petition/Cross Motion and 
Affidavits (Affirmations) Annexed,___ ___ ____ _ 
Opposing Affidavits (Affirmations). ___ ___ __ _ 
Reply Affidavits (Affinnations) _ _ _ ______ _ 
_ ____ Affidavit (Affirmation) _____ _ _ _ 
Other Papers documents subm itted by respondent 
. . 
m camera review 
Papers Numhcrcu 
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Upon the foregoing papers, petitioner Ivan Rios moves for a Judgment pursuant to 
CPLR article 78, reversing and vacating the May 8, 2006 determination of respondent New 
York State Division of P;irolr (Parole Board) withholding petitioner's release to parole 
superv ision, and directing the Parole Board to grant petitioner another parole hearing to 
reconsider whether petitioner should be released to parole supervision. 
On August 16, 1986, petitioner, then 19 years of age and armed with a .22 caliber 
revolver, and five others wcnc to a planned location for a confrontation with another group 
of people. There, one of the members of the ii val group charged petitioner and one of his 
companions; in response, petitionerpointcd the gun in front of himself, fired two shots and 
then fled. Two men were fatally wounded by petitioner's shots and petitioner was later 
charged, under Kings County lndiclrnenl Number 6089/86, with two counts of murder in the 
second degree. After pleading guilty to those charges, by judgment dated November 5, 1987, 
petitioner was sentenced lo two aggregalc pri'son terms of eighteen years to I ifc, those· 
sentences to run concurrently. 
Petitioner first became eligible for discretionary parole in 2004 and appeared before 
the Parole Board that year. Following a hearing, the Parole Board denied petitioner's parole 
request and ordered him held for a period of twenty-four months, after which period, the 
Parole Board would reconvene to reconsider his parole request. 
Petitioner appeared before the Parole Board for a second time on May 8, 2006, and 
again was denied parole; the Parole Board again ordered that parole would not be 
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reconsidered for twenty-four months. It is this denial that petitioner seeks to vacate on the 
grounds that it was arbitrary and capricious and violated his constitutional rights to due 
process and equal protection of the law. Pe ti lio11cr further claims that the Parole Board was 
improperly constituted. 
The court first n.n-ns to that branch of petitioner's motion in which he contends that 
the decision of the Parole Board denying him release on parole was arbitrary and capricious 
and gave undue weight to the nature of the crime committed. 
Parole release is a discretionaty function of the parole board and its dete1111ination 
should not be disturbed by the court unless it is shown that the Board's dccis1011 is irrational 
"bordering on impropriety" and that the determination was, thus arbitrmy and capricious (see 
Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000]; Marter of King v New York State Div. 
of Parole, 190 AD2d 423 [ 1993]; Matter of Weinstein vDennison, 7 Misc3cl 1009(a)[2005]; 
Matter of Coaxum v New York State Div. of Parole, 14 Misc 3d 661 [2006J). ln reviewing 
tbe Board's decision, the comt must also examine whether the Board's discretion was 
properly exercised in accordance with the Executive Law. Section 259-J [2][ c] of that statute 
provides: 
Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a 
reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
while confined but after. considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for law. 
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The statute provides the Board with the .following specific factors to be considered 
in determining whether the above general criteria has been met: 
(I) the institutional record including program goals and 
n(;l'Ompli8i 1mc11 ts, iH.:ad~m ic acl 1ic,·e1m.:11ls, vm;a timrn l educa11011, 
training nr work assignments, lhcr:ipy and interpersonal 
relat ionsh ips with ~tarrand inm11tcs; (i i) pcri'mmanc.:c, if any, as 
a participant in a temporary release progrnni; (iii) release plans 
int.:luding community rcsmircci-;, employm c11l, cducnlit>n nnd 
training and support services nvailablc to the inrnnle; (iv} a11y 
dcponarion order issued by the feclern l government ... nnd (v) 
the written statement or the t:rime victim or the victim's 
representative, where the cri me victim is deceased or is mentally 
or physically in cu paci ta led. 
(Executive Law§ 259-I (2) [c)). 
Additionally, where, as here, the sentencing court has sci the minimum period of 
incarceration, the Parole Board must also take into account: 
(I) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the 
type of sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the 
sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney for the 
inmate, the pre-sentence probation report as well as 
consideration of any mitigating and aggravating factors, and 
activities following arrest and prior to confinement; and (ii) 
prior criminal record, including the nature and pattern of 
offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole 
supervision and institutional confinement (Executive Law § 
259-1 [1] [a]; [2] ]c]). 
Here, after a review of the record before the Parole Board, the court concludes that 
the denial of petitioner's application was a result of the Parole Board's failure to weigh all 
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of the relevant statuto1y factors . Instead, the Parole Board focused almost entirely upon the 
nature of petitioner's crime and, indeed, "there is a strong indication that the denial of 
petitioner's application was a foregone conclusion" (Matter of King, I 90 AD2d at 431 -432). 
The thirty-nine year-old petitioner stood before the Parole Board having already once 
' . 
before been denied parole after serving the minimum sentence for the crime he had 
committed 20 years earlier when he was 19 years of age. At the parole hearing, petitioner 
admitted his guilt in the shooting, stating: 
What I did was a cowardly act. At this point I don't tiy to take 
that away. I can't express to you exactly what emotion I was 
feeling on that day except for fear, but 1 know now it was a 
cowardly act. It takes [more] bravery not to use violence than 
to use violence. 
When asked how he had changed since the day he had committed the 
crime, petitioner stated: 
I have thought about that over the years also, and basically I'd 
like to think of myself as more mature. 1 'm also sadder inside 
because I have done something I can't take back. I have to live 
with that, and some day I'm going to face my creator, and I'm 
going to have to make accounts for what I did, and that's a day 
I fear. 
Petitioner also advised the Parole Board that he had obtained two degrees while 
incarcerated - a bachelor's degree in business administration and an associate's degree in 
small business management with a major in marketing. 
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The record before the Parole Board included a letter dated February 4, 2004 which 
was written by Robert Maboney, a retired lieutenant with the New York State Department 
of Correctional Services \.Vho, since his retirement has worked as a volunteer at Arthur Kill 
Correctional Facility, where pctitionehs an inmate. ln that letter Mahoney states that he met 
petitioner, an ex-marine, some three years earlier when petitioner became a member of the 
American Legion Post which Mahoney had founded in the prison in 1989. According to 
Mahoney, petitioner is an active member of the post and has volunteered a great deal of his 
time to working on a number of fundraiscrs. Further, states Mahoney, petitioner is the 
coordinator of the family day events which are held each year at the prison and is both a tutor 
and a counselor to inmates assigned to the "Special Needs Unit." 
Mahoney states that ns petitioner's interest in providing services to inmates grew, he 
became the Post's "service officer" and, in that capacity worked with his fellow veterans who 
were preparing for release with housing needs, getting into community drug programs, and 
with any other medical needs. Finally, Mahoney states that, in 2003, petitioner was elected 
to Post's highest pos ition, that of Commander, and that he has been doing a good job at 
keeping up the morale of the other members of tlie Post. Mahoney expressed his belief that 
petitioner has "accomplished [sic) a new meaning in his life" and that he would "be able to 
carry this with him while leading a productive life." 
Sergeants A. Jorge and D. Blankinship also submitted letters to the Parole Board 
' attesting to petitioner's positive adjustment to prison and his work with the veteran 's group. 
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The parole file also reveals that petitioner has worked at the Department of Motor 
Vehicles (Motor Vehicles) in Richmond County since 200 I through a work program set up 
between the Depm1ment of Corrections and Motor Vehicles. In a letter a Mrs. Rodriguez, 
who has supervised petitioner at Motor Vehicles since 2003, states that petitioner is 
"extremely helpful and knowledgeable" about the procedures at Motor Vehicles. According 
to Rodriguez, petitioner is a team leader whose responsibilities include teaching new 
procedures to his fellow workers, and he "does so efficiently and thoroughly" and is 
"extJemely cooperative and respectful." Janice Salvatore, also from Motor Vehicles, states 
in her letter to the Parole Board that petitioner's "ability to interact respectively with a wide 
range of people and personalities has often turned difficult situations into positive ones." 
Salvatore concluded that petitioner's "excellent customer service skills and work efforts . . 
. will surely [be an asset] in whatever position he might hold." Similarly applauding 
petitioner's participation in the work program were written by Theodora Humphry and Ing1id 
Nurse. 
As the above recitation of parts of the record before the Parole Board demonstrates, 
it appears that petitioner has used his time. in prison well and that almost all of the statutory 
factors to be considered by the Parole Board in detennining whether parole should be granted 
weigh in petitioner's favor. In light of this fact, the court would expect a rational explanation 
by the Pa~ole Board for its decision as to why parole was nonetheless denied. Instead, the 





reason its denial parole. Afte1 noting the bare facts of the crime, the decision states: 
when we weigh the fac t that you took two lives against your 
achievements, we believe release at this time is not in the public 
interest. 
... 
\Vhile making a passing reference to his "clean disciplinary record and positive 
progrnnunatic efforts," the Parole Board made clear that those factors no matter how 
impressive, could not justify his release from prison when weighed against the seriousness 
of his crime. Thus, "t]he passing mention in the Parole Board's decision of petitioner's 
rehabilitative achievements cannot se1;re.tQ dem.onstrate that the Parole Board weighed or 
fair ly considered the statuto1y factors·where, as het'e, it appears that such achievemetits 'were 
' > . 
mentioned only to dismiss 01em' u1 light of the seriousness of petitioner's crime (see Matter 
· o.!i.)hiliips ·,; De11ni~oi1: JvLi, Oct. I 2, 2:066, at ~J, co1l;q11Bting Maller of Kir;g, 190 A D2d 
at 434). 
{n co';1tl1,1d,ing that tbc Parole Board's det~rmin~tion was arbitrary and capricious, the 
. , f' • .•. 
Court recognizes that it is not necessary for t~ri,·Parole Board, 'in its decision, to specifica1ly 
f -· ' 
refer to each and ~ve1y one of the statutory factoi·s it considered in its decision granting or 
. I 
denying parole release (Matter o.f King, 190 AD2d at 431; see Matter of Davis v New York 
State Div. Of Parole, 97 AD2d 412 [1985]; People ex rel. Harderxhanji v New York State 
Bd. of Parole, 97 AD2d 3 68 [ 1983 ]), or afford those factors equal weight (see People ex rel. 
Herbert v New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 AD2d 128, 133 [1983]). However, "it is 
unquestionably the duty of the Parole Board to give fair consideration to each of the 
8 
applicable statutory factors as to every person who comes before it, and where the record 
convincingly demonstrates that the Parole Board did in fact fail to consider the proper 
standards, the courts must intervene" (Matter of Killg, 190 AD2d at 43 l ). 
Here, the Parole Board, in essence, revealed in its decision its belief that the sentence 
~ 
which: petitioner roceivep', which provided him with the possibility of parole, was 
inappropriate. [n so doing the Parole Board exceeded its powers; it is the role of the 
legislature to determine the appropriate sentences for particular crimes, and of the judiciary 
to detennine the appropriate sentence for the particular defendant before the court. 
Indeed, in focusing exclusively on the petitioner's crime as a reason for denying 
parole the Parole Board was, in effect, re-sentencing petitioner to a sentence that excluded 
any possibility of parole si nee petitioner is powerless tQ chang~ hi.,s ViSt conduct. And, as the 
Appellate Division has admonished, under similar circumstances, such "re-sentencing" by 
the P~role Board "rcvcal[s] a fundamental misunderstanding of the ,limitations of 
administrative power" (Matter of King, 190 AD2d at 432). 
This court, of course, does not meun to minimize the seriousness oJ petitioner's 
'offense, nor the tragedy of the death of petitioner's victims, however in; affording the 
possibility of parole to those convicted of murder, the legislature has made a determination 
that, despite the seriousness of that crime, rehabilitation is -possible and desirable. fn this 
vein, the Appellate Division stated in Matter of King, supra: 
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Certainly every murder conviction is inherently a matter of the 
utmost seriousness since it reflects the unjustifiable taking and 
tragic loss of a humau life .. Since, however, the Legislature has 
determined that a murder conviction per se should not preclude 
parole, there must be a showing of some aggravating 
circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the Clime itself 
(Matter of King, J 90 AD2d at 433). 
ln short, the court concludes that the Parole Board, in effect, abdicated its 
responsibility to fairly consider all the relevant statutory factors in determining whether 
parole should be granted to petitioner and its resulting decision was arbitrary an.cl capricious. 
The court rejects the petitioner's remaining contentions, including that the Parole 
Board violated his constitutional right to equal protection of the law and that the Parole 
Board 1vvas improperly constituted. 
Accordingly, the court grants the petition, annuls respondent's decision denying 
petitioner's release to parole supervision, and remands pelitioner's request for parole to 
respondent, which, within 30 days of the service of a copy of this order with notice of entry, 
shall hold a new hearing before a different panel. That panel shall consider the statutorily 
required factors, as well as the sentencing minutes from petitioner's murder conviction. 
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Within 14 days after the hearing respondent shall issue a decision, in non-conclusory 
terms, on the appropriateness of petitioner's release to parole supervision. 
The foregoing constitutes the decision, order and judgment of the court. 
HON. MARK'· PAR1'Now 
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